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Flaubert once advised a friend wondering how to approach Montaigne with the following 
advice: ”Don’t read him as children do, for amusement, nor as the ambitious do, to be 
instructed.  No, read him in order to live.”1  Sarah Bakewell’s delightful How to Live, or A life 
of Montaigne in one question and twenty attempts at an answer, takes up Flaubert’s challenge, 
combining a rollicking account of Montaigne’s quest to learn how to live and a biography of 
the man who sought to ask that question with humility and grace.  As Foucault once 
suggested in his 1983 lectures at the Collège de France, Montaigne’s Essays present a new 
ethics of the self, a way of fashioning the self to resist and surmount not only fortune’s 
arrows but also the powerful structures and discourses that unconsciously shape our 
relationships to ourselves and to others.  By writing his Essays, Montaigne reconstituted this 
ancient ethic with a wholly new form of self-reflection and self-exploration; Bakewell’s 
book promises to translate the making of this reflective, thoughtful self to today. 
How to Live consists of three interwoven strands: the story of Montaigne’s life and 
times in sixteenth century France; a history of the reception of the Essays, beginning with 
the great popularity Montaigne enjoyed in his own time and ranging through the periodic 
criticism and acclaim in the following centuries; and an account of the chief elements of 
Montaigne’s thought.  Nobleman, government official, and winegrower, Michel Eyquem 
Montaigne lived in the Périgord area of southwestern France from 1533 until 1592.  Having 
received a classical education in the manner of Erasmus (speaking Latin) and studied law 
(rather desultorily), Montaigne passed thirteen years working at the Bordeaux parlement 
when he decided, at thirty-seven, to retire to his library. “From now on, Montaigne would 
live for himself rather than for duty,” Bakewell writes. (24)  Setting up his collection of 
books, housed in five rows on a curving set of shelves meant to fit the round tower of his 
literary atelier, Montaigne created a veritable chamber of marvels including historical me-
                                                 
1 Gustave Flaubert to Mlle Leroyer de Chantepie, June 16, 1857.  Cited in Sarah Bakewell, How to live, or, A 
life of Montaigne in one question and twenty attempts at an answer (New York: Other Press, 2010), 11.  All quo-
tations from Montaigne come from the Donald Frame translation used by Bakewell.  Page numbers refer 
to Bakewell’s text. 
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morabilia, family heirlooms, and artifacts from South America—all meant to inspire his 
wandering (and writing) mind.  Surrounded by inscriptions from Pliny the Elder, Euripi-
des, and Sophocles on his roof beams, Montaigne fashioned a meditative existence far from 
the bloody troubles raging around him as he sought to unravel himself and his own expe-
rience, depicting, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty once put it ”a consciousness astonished at it-
self.”2 
The crafting and probing of this consciousness in the Essays has rarely ceased astoni-
shing Montaigne’s readers.  A ”baroque bestseller,” (222) the Essays counted among its fash-
ionable readers Henri III, King of France.  At the same time, and in roughly the same gene-
ration as Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal each found his work objectionable: Montaigne’s 
“boundary-blurring ambiguities” alarmed the precision-seeking Descartes, while Pascal, 
despite having an abiding affinity for Montaigne, could not bear the latter’s celebration of 
skepticism.  While Montaigne was nominally a Catholic, his lack of doctrinal purity landed 
the Essays on the Catholic Church’s Index of Prohibited Books in 1676, although by that 
time, as Bakewell notes, Montaigne had already become the favorite reading ”of a disrepu-
table crew of fops, wits, atheists, skeptics, and rakes.” (152)  The proceeding generations 
would have to find their Montaigne in bowdlerized or foreign editions as the Church’s edict 
dried up what was once a steady stream of Montaigne’s prose. 
Foreign editions also had peculiar lives of their own.  While earlier German readers 
most loved (and reprinted) Montaigne’s Volkslieder, the ”cannibal love songs” he repeats in 
”Of Cannibals,” English readers were charmed by the Essays’ style and content.  John Flo-
rio’s translation in 1603 brought the Essays across the Channel; William Shakespeare was 
among its first readers.  Indeed, Montaigne appears to have influenced Shakespeare in 
plays ranging from Hamlet to The Tempest—Harold Bloom has recently referred to Mon-
taigne’s Essays as ”palpably a resort for Hamlet and for Hamlet, play and prince.”3  William 
Hazlitt would later carry forward the English tradition of ”Montaignesque” writing while 
also compiling a Complete Works in 1842, which became the standard edition in Britain over 
the coming years. 
Back in France, a sleek modern edition of 1724, designed by Pierre Coste, elicited a 
subversive Montaigne by adding extra paraphernalia including the complete text of On 
Voluntary Servitude, a Renaissance analogue to the Frankfurt School’s Studies in Authority 
and the Family authored by Montaigne’s dearest friend, Etienne de la Boétie.  Montaigne’s 
intense feelings for La Boétie brought praise from Romantics, although they could not 
support the Essays’ many pleas to ”live temperately.”  As George Sand put it, she was ”not 
Montaigne’s disciple” when it came to his Stoical or Skeptical indifference.  Yet it was pre-
                                                 
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Lecture de Montaigne,” in Éloge de la philosophie et autres essais (Paris: Galli-
mard, 1960), 321-347, 322, Cited in Bakewell, 37. 
3 Harold Bloom, The Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011), 40. 
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cisely this practiced indifference that played an elemental role in Montaigne’s elaboration of 
what it means to live—and speaks to his continued promise today. 
The efflorescence of varied and often contradictory responses to Montaigne’s work 
testifies to the wonderful openness of his Essays as well as the great difficulty of saying 
anything definitive (or definite) about his thought.  While scholars have anxiously sought to 
pin Montaigne as a neo-Stoic or a Skeptic or even a proto-postmodern theorist, Bakewell 
celebrates the sheer diversity of Montaigne’s possible meanings—perhaps the single grea-
test source of his persistent popularity.  A brief rehearsal of some of Bakewell’s ”twenty 
attempts at an answer” to the question of how to live gives a sense of the Essays’ range and 
diversity.  Bakewell asks, ”how to live?” Montaigne might answer: ”Don’t worry about 
death.”  Or: ”Read a lot, forget most of what you read, and be slow-witted.”  Or: ”Be convi-
vial with others.”  Or: ”Guard your humanity.”  Or, simply: ”Be ordinary and imperfect.”  
Montaigne calls his readers (and himself) both to be themselves and to achieve their huma-
nity in the process. “Life should be an aim unto itself, a purpose unto itself,”  he writes. 
(326) 
Bakewell rightly situates the beginning of the Essays in a vivid encounter with death 
to which Montaigne frequently returned in his writings.  When Montaigne was about 
thirty-six, he was out riding when something collided with him from behind, knocking 
down his horse and sending Montaigne into the air.  As Montaigne put it: 
 
There lay the horse bowled over and stunned, and I ten or twelve paces beyond, dead, 
stretched on my back, my face all bruised and skinned, my sword, which I had had in my 
hand, more than ten paces away, my belt in pieces, having no more motion or feeling 
than a log. (13) 
 
One of Montaigne’s servants, riding his horse at full gallop, had struck him” like a colos-
sus.” (14)  His life in the balance, Montaigne found himself experiencing the proximity of 
death somehow at a distance. “I felt infinite sweetness in this repose,”  he later wrote.  It 
was going to be ”a very happy death.” (19) 
Montaigne did not, of course, die.  Instead, this encounter with his own death pro-
foundly affected the Essays.  One could rightly say, as the title of an early essay put it, that 
for Montaigne ”to philosophize is to learn how to die.”  Accepting death became Mon-
taigne’s ”most fundamental, most liberating answer to the question of how to live,” (21) 
and this acceptance led Montaigne directly to the philosophy of the Essays: the exploration 
of the living self and all its richness of experience.  Having confronted death as a certainty, 
Montaigne felt liberated to live with abandon; not fearing his non-existence Montaigne 
could now exist intensely.  Soon Montaigne would leave his job as magistrate in Bordeaux 
and dedicate himself to his reflections. 
In the wake of his accident and as he strove to live with his newly-won equanimity, 
Montaigne found common cause with three schools of ancient philosophy: the Stoics, the 
Skeptics, and the Epicureans.  While each differed in important respects, “Montaigne mixed 
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and matched them according to his needs.” (109)  Montaigne followed these schools’ dedi-
cation to eudaimonia, or human flourishing, which they pursued through practices aimed at 
achieving ataraxia, or equilibrium and imperturbability.  The Epicurean Lucretius suggested 
to Montaigne how one can picture one’s death in order to assuage anxieties over the dis-
appearance of the self.  With the Stoic Seneca, Montaigne also praised prosochē, or mindful-
ness, as a call to attending the inner world as well as to how the outer world can influence 
and unsettle one’s interior balance.  Both Stoics and Epicureans relied on a conception of 
nature as the standard by which to measure one’s own life, and Montaigne took this up as 
well.  Being truly human means ”living appropriately, or à propos, so that one estimates 
things at their right value and behaves in the way correctly suited to each occasion.” (247) 
The tradition of skepticism founded by Pyrrho in the fourth century BCE, called 
”Pyrrhonian skepticism,” proved perhaps most influential for Montaigne’s thought.  Pyrr-
honian skepticism distinguished itself from other skeptical traditions by aiming above all 
else at achieving tranquility and also by assigning pride of place to appearances.   Like Stoi-
cism and Epicureanism, it amounted to a form of therapy, an approach to living with one-
self and one’s place in the world.  This approach, moreover, encouraged one neither to take 
life nor oneself too seriously—a philosophy in perfect harmony with Montaigne’s pre-
ternatural sense of fallibility. “I suspend judgment,” a translation of the Skeptical mantra 
Epokhē, Montaigne took for his own; as Hugo Friedrich put it, Montaigne’s philosophy is 
one of ”unassumingness.” (128)  Skepticism guided Montaigne in work and life, but one 
sees it especially suffusing the Essays.  Bakewell recounts how Montaigne ”filled his pages 
with words such as ‘perhaps,’ ‘to some extent,’ ‘I think,’ ‘It seems to me,’ and so on—words 
which, as Montaigne said himself, ‘soften and moderate the rashness of our propositions.’”  
Bakewell adds: ”They are not extra flourishes; they are Montaigne’s thought, at its purest.” 
(128) 
With only the loosest of doctrines—a hope that philosophy may help one learn to 
die, a faith in nature’s standard for guidance in life, an irreverent love of human fallibility—
Montaigne’s ”thought” is better described as a verb than a noun, as a commitment to the 
activity of thinking and reflection rather than to a system of thought. “Philosophy is 
incarnate” for Montaigne, Bakewell writes (129), and its incarnation comes in the very body 
of the philosopher—the subject and the substance of thinking: 
 
I turn my gaze inward, I fix it there and keep it busy.  Everyone looks in front of him; as 
for me, I look inside of me; I have no business but with myself; I continually observe 
myself, I take stock of myself, I taste myself...  I roll about in myself.  (224) 
 
Montaigne radicalized the ”philosophy as a way of life” propounded by the Hellenistic 
schools, bringing it to a whole new form of self-exploration, where every man or woman 
could become a site of illuminative discovery.  As Montaigne commented on his own 
undertakings: ”I set forth a humble and inglorious life; that does not matter.  You can tie up 
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all moral philosophy with a common and private life just as well as with a life of richer 
stuff.” (317-8)   
The Essays not only depict the man Montaigne wrestling with himself; they also 
model this self-exploration for their readers.  Do the Essays then teach a particular way to 
live?  Early in her study, Bakewell asserts that ”the Essays has no great meaning, no point to 
make, no argument to advance.” (7)  This strikes me as slightly disingenuous.  While Mon-
taigne decidedly is not a doctrinal philosopher, one cannot overlook at least one historical 
and political point of the Essays, namely, their skeptical resistance to the religious fanaticism 
during France’s decades of ”troubles.”  As strident belief fueled horrific violence around 
him, Montaigne’s sangfroid appeared in both thought and practice.  Montaigne praised equi-
librium in the essays and pursued it as a high-level emissary between Henri III and Henri 
of Navarre, the then-Calvinist contender for the throne who would later convert and be-
come Henri IV.  Montaigne, in Bakewell’s words, ”was known as a man who would listen 
thoughtfully to all sides, whose Pyrrhonian principle was to lend his ears to everyone and 
his mind to no one, while maintaining his own integrity through it all.” (247) 
Picking up on this particular point of the Essays, Bakewell suggests that Montaigne 
can speak directly to the turmoils produced by religious conflict in the twenty-first century.  
Recounting Leaguist (ardent pro-Catholic) preachers and lawyers as unleashing a ”fatwa”  
against Henri III for his killing of Henri, duc de Guise, their leader (269), Bakewell evokes 
today’s discontents while describing how Montaigne sought to defuse those in his own 
time.  Indeed, Bakewell goes farther in her final chapter, suggesting that the world ”has 
been sorely in need of a Montaignean politics,” and that “it could use his sense of modera-
tion, his love of sociability and courtesy, his suspension of judgment, and his subtle under-
standing of the psychological mechanisms involved in confrontation and conflict.” (327)  By 
all means!  But what exactly would this ”Montaignean politics” look like? 
At first glance, it seems all too easy to assimilate Montaigne to today’s self-help cul-
ture of gurus and consumerist individualism, and in two ways.  On the one hand, Mon-
taigne simply offers, as Max Horkheimer once put it, ”the Stoicism of the rich”4—a kind of 
narcissistic self-exploration only made possible by wealth and the privilege of isolation.  On 
the other, while Montaigne’s construction of the modern self may have possessed a critical 
edge against the religious dogmas of his own day, today’s cult of the self exists inextricably 
wrapped up with forms of power attributable to capitalism: the isolated self as consumer, 
unencumbered by claims of family, religion, or community.  Montaigne may then present 
precisely what Foucault hoped the ethics of the self might prevent, that is, the disciplining 
of the self by power into a self-policing modern subject.  Bakewell’s own slips into the 
clichés of self-help, such as her characterizing Montaigne’s philosophy as teaching how to 
”go with the flow” (22) or ”keep one’s feet on the ground,” (220) do little to contradict such 
a reading.  If today’s discourses of the self qua isolated subject, as Charles Taylor has sug-
                                                 
4 Max Horkheimer, “Montaigne and the Function of Skepticism,” in Between Philosophy and Social Science: 
Selected Early Writings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 265-312, 272. 
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gested, impoverish our ability to articulate the self’s deeper sources and thus to create any 
meaningful horizons for understanding our own existence, Montaigne may do more harm 
than good.5 
Yet Bakewell also warns against just such an interpretation.  Rather than reading 
Montaigne as offering only ”an incitement to self-indulgence” or simply heightening to-
day’s destructive cults of the self, Bakewell claims that Montaigne calls his readers to a 
newly revitalized experience of their relations with others—a kind of humanism.  As Bake-
well writes: ”No abstract principles are involved: there are only two individuals, face to 
face, hoping for the best from one another.” (327)  Montaigne takes the self-help culture and 
elevates it.  Montaigne’s ethics of the self then emerge through dialogue and attentive rela-
tionship to human, non-human, and even material others.  Montaigne found the highest 
moments of life in conversation with his beloved friend La Boétie; he discovered his grea-
test insights when gazing at his cat; he found remarkable significance in cataloging the 
strange eating habits of different places and times.  This kind of engaged receptivity toward 
himself and others seeks above all to break free from habit and thus live as a more fully 
human being.  A ”Montaignean politics” built on this foundation is surely worth pursuing. 
While the dangers of a shallow self-creation persist today, Montaigne thus reminds 
us that creating and sustaining a self must come through our relationships with others.  Put 
more polemically, the struggle for the self must also be political: Achieving a ”Montaignean 
politics” is not just a matter of each one of us cultivating our own gardens by adopting 
some of Montaigne’s ”tricks” to achieve equanimity and mindfulness; we require one 
another in order to live.  By creating the Essays and thus an audience for his self-reflections, 
Montaigne acknowledged the need for more than lonely lucubration; he sought connection 
with his readers and solidarity for his self-exploration.  Bakewell has broadened Mon-
taigne’s public to include us denizens of the twenty-first century.  Read, learn and live. 
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5 See Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Harvard: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
